The Egyptian Army WWII
Before WWII, military service was compulsory for men between the ages of 19 and 27, but because of the limited size of the Egyptian Army—23,000 in 1939— few were actually conscripted. During World War II, Egypt’s Army grew to about 100,000 troops. Britain maintained a strong influence in the military and provided it with equipment, instruction, and technical support. Under the terms of the 1936 treaty, British troops remained in Egypt to defend the Suez Canal.
Egypt severed relations with the Axis powers soon after the outbreak of World War II, but remained technically neutral until nearly the end of the war. Some Egyptians flew patrol duty in British aircraft with British pilots during the war and the Egyptian navy participated with a few British-supplied patrol boats. Egyptians were used primarily for guard duty and logistical tasks, rather than for combat. Some Egyptian officers favored Germany as a means to end British influence in their country. For example, the British imprisoned Anwar Sadat because of his pro-German activities. Aware of such sentiments, the British were reluctant to use Egyptian units in any active combat role—even after King Farouk declared war against the Axis in February, 1945.
Rommel did not take the Egyptian Army into consideration as a factor when he planned his invasion into Egypt. Veteran Egyptian officers interviewed agree their army was no match whatsoever for a contemporary western force. They were not able to conduct mobile operations on any scale and would not have survived any encounter with a mobile force. They could have been put to some useful purpose if well entrenched, supported by artillery, and in a static defense. In any offensive mission, they probably would have failed.
The main reason for this was the lack of training given to officers concerning such missions. The Sudanese troops used in the Frontier District Administration (the border guards) were effective and fierce fighters. One of the FDA’s former officers reports that their equipment was not up to the task of fighting regular armies of the day.
Egyptian Army composition as discovered by Steve Rothwell in the RAC Museum archives in a box of 7th Arm Div records untouched since the war…
Mobile Force Brigade
• one Light Tank Company
• one 3.7 Howitzer Battery
• one MG Company
Frontier District Administration North Detachment
• one Light Infantry Company
mounted in Ford Pickups
Frontier District Administration South Detachment
• one Light Infantry Company
mounted in Ford Pickups
Frontier District Administration Main Detachment
• three Light Infantry Companies mounted in Ford Pickups
1st MG Bde
• two MG Battalions
Egyptian Artillery Bn
• two 25 ldr Batteries
• one 105mm Battery
1st Infantry Bde
• two Infantry Battalions
• one MG Battalion
2nd Infantry Bde
• two Infantry Battalions
1st Egyptian Light Artillery Battalion
• one 3.7 inch Howitzer Battalion transported by Mules
Egyptian Camel Corps (detachment battalions spread all over southern Egypt and into Sudan, two on-map)
• Siwa Camel Battalion (guarding Siwa oasis)
• Hauwasa Camel Battalion (guarding Hausawa Pyramid and cultivated area)
For the Royal Egyptian Air Force, we have from the History of the Armed Forces of Egypt, 1914-1945 Translated from the Arabic by Thomas Scheben) the following:
May 1940
1st Squadron (Ground Support): 15 Lysanders
2nd Squadron (Fighter): 18 Gladiators
4th Squadron (Bomber): 6 Audax
5th Squadron (Fighter): 18 Gladiators
May 1941
1st Squadron (Ground Support): 17 Lysanders
2nd Squadron (Fighter): 16 Gladiators
3rd Squadron (Target Towing): 1 Tiger Moth, 1 Anson Avro 652
4th Squadron (Bomber): 10 Audax
5th Squadron (Fighter): 17 Gladiators
Flying School: Several types
What were these troops worth? A few quotes bring out the contemporary appraisal.
Major A.W. Sansom (Head of the Cairo Branch of the British Secret Service, 1940) reports to the British command:
“The morale of the Egyptian troops is at the lowest possible ebb. It is unlikely to rise unless we are defeated in battle, in which event they would almost certainly go over to the enemy. If Mersa Matruh is attacked, they will not resist, but will probably help the attackers. Our position would be stronger without them, even if no replacements are available.”
The Egyptian point of view is reflected in the leading national daily newspaper (Al-Ahram) of 19 Sept 1940 in a quote from former Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi:
“The Italian offensive is not an aggression against Egypt, but against another belligerent on the territory of a third and occupied power.”
Again from Major Sansom, this time from his memoirs:
“Most British observers, including myself, thought the Egyptian Army’s value as a fighting force was negligible. The officers, over whom Prince Daoud (the army Commander-in-Chief) had little control, spent most of their time with their wives in the Cecil Hotel in Alexandria, and were full of resentment against their hard life in the desert. The troops, who lived on an appalling diet of dried beans and lentil soup, with an occasional bit of meat, regarded the officers with envious hatred and were ready to fire the first shots in their backs. As the officers were all well aware of this, there was a tradition of leading from behind. Officers and men alike panicked in air raids and it was a standing joke among British troops, that the Egyptian encampments moved further from the coast road after each heavy raid.”
It is one of the heroic myths circulated in Nasser’s Egypt that when ordered away from the frontier by Churchill, the younger officers were deeply humiliated and actually considered starting a revolution. The truth is the whole force was delighted to get away from the fighting and the desert. All these younger officers could talk about was getting back to comfortable quarters and bright lights.
What was the value of the Egyptian Army in World War II? Answer: Not much, regardless of which side it chose to fight on. This assessment was verified in the Egyptian Army’s abysmal performance in 1948 and 1956.
