THE RED VERDUN
by Richard Clarke
“You know, I am sure, that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them “ Xenophon circa 250BC
The Russian Civil War was a conflict that saw a number of factors combine to result in a struggle that was unique in the twentieth century. Civil wars always have certain dimensions that set them apart from the more usual conflicts between nation states, the concept of patriotism, for one, is blurred. But in Russia other additional and quite unique factors were at work.
The horrors of the Great War were such that, in general, the population was heartily sick of conflict. Add to this the vast peasant population that existed in a huge area, where communication was poor and education very limited, and one has a picture of a world where local issues, such as planting crops, harvests and so on, become of far greater personal importance than what is occurring at national or even international level. As a consequence the Civil War, after its initial embryonic stage, saw forces made up of largely disinterested and unenthusiastic conscripts (often prisoners of war now employed to fight their former comrades) led by a ruling elite, be that the elite of the old regime or the new Bolshevist elite, who were passionately committed to their cause. The net result was armies that had more in common with their feudal counterparts in history, fighting for the interests of their masters, without any real comprehension or enthusiasm for the actual cause.
Another throwback that emerged in the vastness of Russia was the re-emergence of cavalry as a significant force. This was both strategically, due to its mobility, and tactically due to its moral impact on the types of troops outlined. These forces bring to mind the hordes of Ghengis Khan and Taras Bulba, indeed they would have been more recognisable to them than anyone at Horse Guards.
The result of these factors combining was a war of immense movement, where brittle troops could be advancing rapidly over huge distances while on a victorious roll, but equally retreating with the same vigour after any reverse of fortunes. In such a conflict issues such as what type of rifle troops are using, and even levels of training become secondary to near unquantifiables such as strength of purpose or will power. Indeed, looking at Xenophon’s comments at the start of the article, we have a quote nearly two and a half thousand years old, but one that is still particularly relevant to this conflict. Indeed this concept goes some way to explain how the nucleus of the White movement that fought for its very existence in Russia’s deepest south was able not just to survive in the face of overwhelming numerical odds, but to find itself threatening the very existence of the Bolshevist state within a year. And, indeed, how weeks later was again on the point of complete collapse. Armed resistance to the Bolshevik government was, as in so many civil wars, split geographically. In an era where communications were primitive Russia was further hampered by her sheer size. The three main groups of resistance were led by Yudenich in the northwest of the country; Admiral Kolchak from the Urals eastwards; and General Deniken in the south around Rostov and the Sea of Azov.
The Whites initially were represented by a group of former officers and NCOs who had volunteered in small numbers to combat Bolshevist rule. Soon, however, demand for numbers meant that while a nucleus of highly motivated officers remained, the majority of the White forces in the south were made up of either Cossacks who had quickly become disenchanted with Bolshevik rule, or conscripts and “turned” POWs. This expansion, made possible to a significant degree by a succession of victories, created what was essentially a self-feeding entity. If it attacked and won then the conscription of Red POWs into White ranks allowed it opportunity to expand its numbers, thereby fuelling further advances. In this situation to advance is to continue to exist, to retreat is to face destruction. To a large extent, therefore, the Whites’ broad strategic approach, to advance maintaining the initiative, was dictated by circumstance. The real issue then had to be which way to advance in order to best maintain this momentum. In South Russia there were, and still are, two differing opinions of which route should have been taken. These views were, largely, personified by two very different men.
DENIKEN & WRANGEL
General Anton Deniken was the White Supreme commander in South Russia. Son of a Russian soldier and a Polish peasant mother, Deniken was from lowly stock by the standards of the day. This did not stop him, however, from attending Junker school and gaining a commission in the Imperial Russian Army. His career was not particularly noteworthy; his performance during the Great War was always solid rather than exceptional. Indeed when the Volunteer Army was originally formed it was General Lavr Kornilov who headed the force, with Deniken as a solid second in command. It was only the untimely death of Kornilov before Ekaterinodar in 1918 that saw Deniken propelled into the role of commander-in-chief. In terms of strategy Deniken favoured an advance directly against Moscow, the centre of Red power.
Opposed to Deniken’s view was General Baron Peter Wrangel. In terms of background Wrangel could not have been more different. The Wrangel family was a well-known tribe who had served various masters throughout Europe. In the Swedish, Prussian and Russian armies Wrangels had all risen to high levels, and as such Peter Wrangel came from exalted stock. He was an officer of the Imperial Guard cavalry with a dashing service record in the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War, in both of which he had accepted commands with Cossack regiments. Now, during the Civil War, it was again Cossack forces that Wrangel commanded, assuming their traditional attire as his trademark. Wrangel, with his force on the right flank of Deniken’s armies, was in favour of an advance up the Volga River to link with Admiral Kolchak’s Siberian forces around Saratov. Deniken’s option of a direct advance towards the Red heart had certain attractions. Firstly the Cossack lands, with their separatist leaning governments, would be protected from Red incursions and thereby kept on side. The areas that would be “liberated” in any advance northwards would be more populous, with cities like Kharkov providing fresh recruits. Additionally this line of advance would put constant and unrelenting pressure on the Red military, not allowing them the luxury of time to regroup and reorganise, a factor critical to the Whites when they were at severe numerical disadvantage, and needed to maintain their grip on the initiative. An added benefit was that Deniken, who was always having to keep one eye on international opinion, would have the opportunity to create headlines that would encourage his supporters (and Quartermasters) in the French and British governments in believing that they were supporting not just the preferred side, but also the winning side.
Wrangel, on the other hand, believed that the main thrust to link with Kolchak was the key to ultimate victory. Certainly it is true that divided forces are at a significant disadvantage and can be defeated in detail. In the Spanish Civil War Franco’s drive northwards from Seville with the Army of Africa was not simply about attempting to seize the national capital. It was also about linking Nationalist zones in the north and south of the country so that efforts could be co-ordinated. When Madrid did not fall in 1936, this campaign still left the Nationalists united, and with the initiative. Indeed, Wrangel was looking at the bigger picture than simply the “On to Moscow” slogans of Deniken’s camp. However, Wrangel’s plan called at best for a maintaining of the status quo elsewhere, in the hope of allowing the White armies a stable period in which numbers could be increased and a feeling of permanence achieved within their structures. At worst, particularly from a Cossack perspective, was the suggestion that their homelands should be left exposed to the Reds, while their men-folk went campaigning with Kolchak. This was simply not a viable option in this war. Indeed it could be argued that Wrangel’s approach would have allowed the initiative to pass over to the Reds, allowing them time to co-ordinate their forces against the single thrust up the Volga.
Whoever was correct, what emerged was a compromise. Deniken was oft inclined to be more accommodating with his senior commanders than circumstances should have demanded. In this case he ordered Wrangel to lead his forces to Moscow, but rather than the most direct route he was to go via Saratov. This is rather like going from London to Manchester via Norwich, but it would, if successful, facilitate a link with White Siberian forces, thereby appeasing Wrangel. Elsewhere White forces were to head rather more directly for Moscow.
THE ADVANCE TO TSARITSYN
So, with his largely Cossack force, Wrangel pushed on with his advance northwards. His first objective was to take Tsaritsyn on the Volga, from where he would advance northwards to Saratov.
Tsaritsyn had nearly fallen to a Cossack force under Ataman Krasnov in the summer of 1918. Its defence was then organised by a certain Joseph Stalin who was in the area ostensibly co-ordinating food supplies for Moscow. In the spirit of the time the city became known as the “Red Verdun”, and the spirit of Ils ne passerent pas was adopted. Stalin had stuck his oar in, much to the annoyance of Trotsky, and ensured that the city and its industrial workers held out. This was the beginning of a personal animosity between Stalin and Trotsky that finished with an ice pick in Mexico City some years later. When in power, Stalin would advertise his “victory” by changing the city’s name to Stalingrad, under which guise it went on to find some notoriety. That, however, was some way in the future.
Now, the Bolsheviks recognised that the defence of Tsaritsyn would allow them to control the Volga, and stop the Whites in the south and east linking arms. Nevertheless, co-ordinating their forces to oppose Wrangel was a matter far from simple. White advances during May and June were everywhere rapid. To the west the advance towards Moscow seemed unstoppable, and the immediate priority for any spare resources had to be the new Bolshevist capital.
To look at the overall military context of Wrangel’s operation we need to look back a few weeks. The start of May had seen the Red 10th Army on the offensive, driving south towards Rostov and the Kuban. By mid month these 30,000 Red troops had pushed the Don Cossacks back over the Manytch River and were less than a hundred miles from Rostov at Torgovaia, and threatening the security of the Kuban Cossack homelands. This, the White heartland in South Russia, was in serious danger. To counter this threat to their very existence Deniken concentrated three Army Corps. Blocking the enemy frontally with two he sent General Ulagai’s Cavalry Corps out to the right, swinging round into the rear of the Red 10th Army.
Ulagai, a Moslem from Russia’s deep south and a regular cavalry officer, proved the effectiveness of well handled cavalry in this war of vast open spaces. Very quickly his forces captured six Red Regiments and thirty guns, and what is more interrupted the flow of supplies and communications along the railway from Tsaritsyn.
Egorov, the Red Commander, sent six of his own cavalry regiments under Dumenko to deal with this threat to his rear. The two forces met on 17 May and a hard fought battle saw the Red cavalry defeated, and 10th Army’s communications very definitely severed.
The next day Wrangel’s troops crossed the Manytch in a novel fashion. Unable to cross with his artillery support as the Red held bridges, Wrangel, an Engineer by training, stripped the surrounding villages of their garden fences in order to produce a very makeshift causeway across the broad marshy river. Once across his army initiated three days fighting which saw the Whites capture Velikokniazheskaia and nearly completely destroy the 10th Red Army. 15,000 men and 55 guns reportedly fell as prisoners into Wrangel’s hands.
Here, however, geography aided the retiring Reds. Between Velikokniazheskaia and Tsaritsyn lay 200 miles of inhospitable steppe, largely devoid of water and shelter. The main communication artery. the railway line, had its bridges blown, stations damaged and water towers destroyed. In some areas extensive swamps meant that destroyed viaducts would need major civil engineering works before the Whites could reopen the line for reinforcement and supplies.
For now, however, Wrangel’s cavalry pushed on. Pokrovsky’s Cavalry Corps on the railway line, Ulagai’s Corps on the right, and Chatilov’s Don Cossack Corps in reserve. The 6th Infantry Division, Wrangel’s main infantry force, and its Corps artillery were obliged to follow as best it could. What was now being dubbed the Caucasian Army got its orders to take Tsaritsyn.
For the Reds the remains of the Red 10th Army was retreating in the best order it could manage. It stopped and took up positions behind the Esau Aksai River in the hope of holding the line. This force, battered as it was, was not without teeth. One command still managed to hinder White progress, the Red cavalry of Semyon Budyonny. A former cavalry NCO in the Tsar’s Army, who interestingly enough had served under Ulagai during the Great War, Budyonny had embraced the new Soviet regime wholeheartedly. Militarily Budyonny was no slouch. During the war against the Germans he had won all five grades of the Order of St George. His somewhat more significant achievement since then had been to train and motivate a cavalry force able to challenge the hegemony of the Whites.
Commanding a Corps at this stage, Budyonny was able to strike a significant blow against Wrangel. At the end of May he overran and captured the White 6th Infantry Division, the main infantry formation of the Caucasian Army. A timely counter-attack by Ulagai recaptured the artillery, but the infantry were lost; Wrangel now had what was essentially a cavalry army to conduct an assault on a modern fortified line.
This stage of the campaign saw the worst of the relationship between Deniken and Wrangel. When given the goal of Tsaritsyn Wrangel had requested reinforcements, particularly infantry and artillery. Deniken had agreed. As time progressed Wrangel’s requests became louder and more hostile. This reflected his absolute belief in his assessment of the military situation, and his equally absolute belief that headquarters was intentionally ignoring him.
Deniken, however, had a bigger picture to consider. The Volunteer Army was advancing on Kharkov, the fall of which would mark a strategic and geographical milestone on the road to Moscow, and the front line was on the verge of doubling in length in the period of a single week. Resources were thin on the ground, and with the rail line to Tsaritsyn still out of use it could well be argued that any reinforcements would have been subjected to an horrific march across the worst terrain at the height of summer. These, however, were points that Wrangel chose to ignore, both at the time and later when penning his memoirs.
THE FINAL HURDLE
In early June the Red line along the Esau Aksai River ceased to be. Accounts differ in that the Whites claim it was breached by an assault, the Reds claim their withdrawal was a strategic one. Whatever the truth the last viable defensive position before Tsaritsyn itself was no more, and the Caucasian Army had its goal immediately in its sights.
On 11 June a council of war was held. Wrangel needed to make a critical decision. Tsaritsyn was being continually reinforced and fortified. To attack now, before the promised reinforcements arrived would be to fly totally in the face of accepted military thought, and attack a fortified city with a cavalry force. It would, however, maintain the initiative and put pressure on an enemy that had got used to retiring before the White advance. Additionally the Red force was as weak now as it ever would be. To wait would see their foe get stronger, whereas the White Cossacks would be left sitting in the open steppe in mid summer, with no supplies or shelter.
In the end Wrangel, in consultation with Ulagai and Chatilov, took the decision to attack immediately. Because of the flotilla of Red gunboats on the Volga it was decided that an attack from due west would stand the best chance of success. On 14 June Chatilov’s cavalry breached the initial Red defences, seizing the villages of Basargino and Voroponova. There they reformed, ready to push on their attack on the following day, but here twentieth century technology got in the way. Tsaritsyn was surrounded by a large rail network; this allowed the Red defenders tremendous flexibility in both moving troops, and (more importantly) the use of armoured trains. The next day further White attempts at advancing were beaten off with heavy losses by this mobile artillery force.
Wrangel declared his losses at command level as five divisional commanders, three brigade commanders and eleven Regimental commanders. He reported back to Deniken that “without artillery, infantry and technical aids the city cannot be taken by storm. It is to be assumed that in the event of a Red counter-attack our army, bled white as it is, will have to give ground.”
Indeed, Wrangel did not have to wait long. On 17 June the Red advance began. Wrangel withdrew his force 20 miles to positions behind the Tchervlennia River. Here, with the aid of 47 Squadron RAP, a volunteer British and Empire unit, they held the line.
A Corps of cavalry under Mamontov was sent across the Don to raid into the enemy’s rear in an attempt to take some pressure off Wrangel. More dialogue was now entered into with Headquarters, none of it amicable nor original in content. Reinforcements were still demanded, and this in terms that reflected Wrangel’s impatience. Here news was somewhat better. With the rail link to Tsaritsyn now nearly restored a division of infantry, three regiments in total, five batteries, three armoured trains and six tanks were allocated to move immediately to entraining points at Rostov. These began to arrive at the front on 26 June, and Wrangel began to plan a fresh attack.
We should note here the progress of General Mamontov’s cavalry, which, having crossed the Don, swung east into 10th Red Army’s rear. On 23 June it captured Loznoye and Davydovka directly to the north of Tsaritsyn. On the following day it raided Dubovka on the banks of the Volga. Once again White cavalry were operating on Red lines of communication. This time Budyonny’s Red cavalry were sent to deal with the threat. Mamontov retired before this foe, and in doing so made a serious contribution to the main attack on the city. Budyonny’s Cavalry Corps was one of the most effective Red units present on that front, and they were now being pulled away from the city, westwards towards the Don. Budyonny, as we see from his memoirs, was bemused by Mamontov’s actions. “What was the reason for Mamontov’s hasty retreat? Why did he not take advantage of his successful raid on Dubovka ? I was of the opinion that Mamontov was influenced by the fear of encountering our Corps and his decision to retreat could certainly not be put down to his ineptitude as a military commander. On the contrary, I rated him as one of the ablest commanders in Krasnov’s and Deniken’s armies”.
An interesting viewpoint that probably tells us more about Budyonny’s ego than Mamontov’s motivations. Indeed, I am convinced that Mamontov was soldier enough to be fully aware that as a force in being he was achieving his prime objective, to draw troops away from the defensive lines around Tsaritsyn. This view is supported by the fact that on 29 June Mamontov marshalled his forces and launched a major attack on Budyonny, with the purpose of pinning this significant foe whilst the main attack to the south was launched. Indeed through his actions Mamontov ensured that Budyonny played no part in the main fight for Tsaritsyn.
THE BATTLE FOR TSARITSYN
By the end of June Tsaritsyn was well defended against infantry and cavalry attack. A preliminary ring of infantry trenches with some MG nests was backed up by a deep belt of barbed wire. Behind this was the main line of trenches and artillery emplacements. A final defensive line was situated on the edge of Tsaritsyn itself. In support of all this the rail network again allowed Red armoured trains to deploy at will against any attack. A strong hand indeed. The question was, could Wrangel trump it?
Several factors were different from White initial attempts to take the city, two were key. Firstly Wrangel now had access to three armoured trains that could provide significant mobile fire support. Secondly, and most importantly, were the five British tanks that, from the original six supplied, were still serviceable.
One 26 June Wrangel was approached by Major Bruce, commander of the British tank mission, who requested that the British tankers lead the advance. The following day Bruce and Captain Walsh, (the latter was to command the leading Mark V tank) and two Russian tank section commanders reconnoitred the front. Bruce then overflew Red positions in a 47 Squadron aeroplane, downing a Red observation balloon as part of the trip. The preliminary work necessary prior to any tank attack at this time was significant. Despite the images we have of these gargantuans crossing the worst terrain the western front could throw at them, the truth was somewhat different. In fact the tanks were prone to constant breakdown, and needed a relatively level and solid route planned in advance in order to ensure that they could actually get into action, let alone achieve their objectives. By now 10th Red Army’s initial defensive line stretched along from Peskovatka by the Don, down to Karpovka, and then across to the Volga to the south of Beketovska. However significant numbers of troops had been diverted to the north and west of the city to protect it from any outflanking movement. Indeed RAF reports tell of the line of barbed wire circling the city on all sides away from the Volga at a distance of some fifteen miles from central Tsaritsyn. Wrangel decided on an attack from due south, and began to concentrate his forces there.
In order to counter the flotilla of Red gunboats on the Volga he once again deployed 47 Squadron RAP to cause as much damage as possible here, and ideally to drive them back to their base up river.
As for the land force, the tanks detrained near Ivanovka along with the fresh reinforcements of the 7th White Division and their supporting artillery. Wrangel stripped his centre along the Tchervlennia River to add his only Cossack infantry brigade to the attack, along with a handful of armoured cars. Two corps of cavalry were also moved down, ready to exploit any breakthrough.
The plan of attack was for the two Mark V tanks to break through the Red preliminary lines to the south of the city, cutting into the barbed wire, and then turning to run along it for six miles, pulling the wire by means of a grapple attachment towed behind. Meanwhile the three lighter Whippet tanks were to move through the initial gap in the wire and then move rapidly to Beketovska to engage the main Red batteries that were deployed there. In support of these would be three armoured cars which would, in turn, be followed by the White infantry and then the cavalry. White armoured trains were to advance in close support of these movements.
If this was a precursor to blitzkrieg, with emphasis on an armoured spearhead penetrating enemy lines, it was a rather sedate one. It is worth noting that the Whippet tank, so called for its speed, could only manage 9 mph at best, and this was putting the vehicle in danger of mechanical breakdown. Probably the most telling illustration of this fact is there-supply arrangements for these tanks. Each vehicle had a bullock cart attached, with orders to follow the tank with a refill of petrol, oil and grease.
At 02.00 on 29 June the tanks headed for the Bolshevist front line. This they crossed at 02:30. As they approached they came under heavy rifle and MG fire, but no artillery was deployed this far forward and no losses were sustained. After a quarter of an hour the Reds retired, allowing the British Mark V to move along the enemy line, pulling wire as it went. At this point the other Mark V, with its Russian crew, became separated when it went to the assistance of a Whippet which had become entangled in the wire.
The British tank under Captain Walsh proceeded along the belt of barbed wire, coming under fire from Red batteries in the main line. As the morning progressed White infantry that had originally been held back were released, and advanced to exploit the gaps in the defences. At 05:00, while stopping to confer with an infantry commander, the British tankers report notes in a pinnacle of understatement that “Captain Walsh was wounded by a shell splinter”. In fact his arm was ripped off (!) and Captain McElvaine took command.
Meanwhile the Russian manned tanks had engaged the enemy, moving parallel to the main Red lines, engaging them with MG fire. In the process they too met with Red artillery, and under pressure they withdrew to their starting point, where, at 06:00 a somewhat bemused Major Bruce sent them back into the fray with orders to achieve the pre-arranged rally point at Beketovska where they were due to meet the British-crewed tank.
In fact the real breakthrough was effected not by the tanks, but by the Russian armoured cars which, breaking into the rear of the main Red line caused panic, and saw Reds abandoning their positions to fall back on the city. This allowed Cossack cavalry to advance to take Voroponovo unopposed. This Red retreat was brief and temporary, as a significant Red cavalry force counter- attacked to restore the line. This time it was White armoured trains that stopped the Red cavalry. Advancing in a close support role these were able to halt the Red advance by concentrated artillery fire.
By midday the tanks had rallied at Beketovska and had been refuelled, oiled and greased. At 3pm Major Bruce joined them, and following communication with Wrangel, ordered them to head directly for Tsaritsyn. Meanwhile White infantry were advancing, at this stage effectively tasked with garrisoning the ground captured by the cavalry, tanks and armoured cars.
At 5pm a strong Red infantry force counter-attacked around Kuperosnoye and succeeded in pushing back the White infantry on the right flank. The tanks were quickly deployed to face this new threat. According to Captain McElvaine “the enemy, on catching sight of the tanks, stopped advancing and commenced to retreat, followed by the Volunteer infantry and the tanks”.
Continuing their advance the tanks and infantry now came under artillery fire from the final Red line. Infantry and MGs in the houses halted any further advance by the White infantry, while the tanks came under direct fire from what McElvaine describes as a dozen 4” guns. Some superficial damage was caused to the tanks by shell splinters, and by now petrol was running short. Bruce ordered his force to lay up in a ravine two miles west of Tsaritsyn, where they were to be re-supplied.
By the end of the first day the preliminary and main Red lines had been dealt with, as had the barbed wire. A cavalry force had simultaneously been sent around the Red lines towards Gumrak to cut lines of retreat to the north-west.
Liaison between the infantry of the 7th Division and the tanks / resulted in plans being drawn up for a further combined advance on the next day, 30 June, beginning again at 02:00. In the event the bullock carts had disappeared, so no such attack was possible. In fact this delay proved to be a blessing. A fresh attack was planned for 07:00, but in the interim the Reds began to evacuate the city, both by river and, where possible, by road and rail. Budyonny’s cavalry Corps acted as a rearguard. At 5pm on 30 June the troops of the White 7th Division entered Tsaritsyn without firing a shot. A number of armoured trains were captured along with significant numbers of prisoners, figures between 15,000 and 40,000 are quoted. More important by far was the boost to White morale. Indeed the fall of Tsaritsyn led Deniken to issue his famous “Moscow Directive”. Sadly for the White cause this paper tiger was to collapse too quickly, and within months advance became retreat, and in some cases rout.
WARGAMING THE BATTLE FOR TSARITSYN
The Russian Civil War has become more popular as a wargaming period recently. This is a situation that has undoubtedly been driven by several excellent figure ranges in a real variety of scales. For me, in l5mm, Peter Pig’s WWIand RCW range is superb, giving a fantastic mix of figures that should allow you to produce any force you could wish for. In larger scales the Honourable Lead Boiler Suit Company and B&B Miniatures produce some equally good figures if you’ve the budget, and more importantly the space for this was of wide open steppes and vast impenetrable forests. Indeed, if you want a true feel for the scale of the conflict I believe Irregular have a 6mm Great War range which can be used to really allow this aspect to come to the fore. A couple of Ospreys and some great books coming out of Russia have helped things along, and a number of rule sets are available commercially.
The conflict has much to recommend it to gamers. Some really gorgeous uniforms, lots of flags, a huge variety of troop types, and lots of “funnies” like armoured trains and British tanks. In terms of campaign options the conflict can be broken down easily into ‘bite sized chunks? concentrating on one specific geographical feature, be that a railway line or a city.
For those interested the Eastern Front Association is particularly relevant, covering all aspects of the Great War on the Eastern Front and the Russian Civil War. Their web site is at www.efal4-21.org.uk. Additionally there is a discussion group on the web as part of Yahoo Groups under the title Russian Civil War. This is primari1y aimed at wargamers of the conflict, and is home to some robust debate on everything from rule ideas to historical information. The Eastern Front Association is as cheap as chips, the Yahoo Group is free, so great value all round.
The following scenario is based on the main attack on the city from the south. The cavalry actions of Budyonny and Mamontov in the north are another issue, which would make a mini-campaign in their own right. The order of battle for Wrangel’s force is as historically accurate as I can get, allowing for the huge fluctuation in unit strengths during the conflict. The Red Army orbat is based on allocating a proportion of the total defenders to the sector that we are looking at. The brigades I have reduced in strength to represent losses incurred thus far, but again which actual units were still intact at this point has had to be guessed at. This is less than satisfactory from the point of view of historical research, but sadly Soviet historians, both at the time and subsequently, tended to focus on their victories and airbrush out the defeats, so it will have to do. From a “game” perspective, which is far more important here, it should provide a tough but winnable game for both players.
The terrain I have taken from German aerial shots of the area in 1942 and a number of maps both contemporary with the battle and later. The map shows the southern approaches to Tsaritsyn, and includes all three defensive lines. The individual briefings are as follows.
White Briefing
Lt General Baron Wrangel
It is June 1919, and the Caucasian Army, having crossed 200 miles of inhospitable steppe, now sits before its goal, Tsaritsyn. For over two weeks now your largely cavalry force has been denied access to the city by its Red defenders. In that time considerable work has been undertaken to strengthen Tsaritsyn’s defences, most formidable being a thick belt of barbed wire and trenches. Attempts to break through these have, so far, failed.
It has not been just the Red Engineers who have been busy, however. The rail link from Rostov to your positions has been re-established, and reinforcements have arrived which should now allow you to launch an effective assault. To the south of the city you have assembled the following force to carry out the attack.
7th Infantry Division
1st Brigade
Composite Regiment of the 4th Rifle Division (4 Battalions)
42nd Infantry Yakutsk Regiment (4 Battalions)
2nd Brigade
Composite Regiment of the 15th Infantry Division (4 Battalions)
Reserve Battalion of the 7th Infantry Division (1 Battalion)
2 Artillery Batteries
3rd Kuban Cossack Plastun Brigade
4 Infantry Battalions
1 Artillery Battery
1st Kuban Cossack Division
5 Cossack Cavalry Regiments
1 Horse Artillery Battery
2nd Kuban Cossack Division
5 Cossack Cavalry Regiments
Armoured Car Section
3 Austin Putilov Armoured Cars (1 model)
Tank Section
2 Mark V Heavy Tanks (1 model)
3 Type A Whippet Tanks (2 models)
Armoured Train
Russia Undivided
Two heavy guns, 2 MG sections
The head of the British tank mission has approached you and, having recconoiterred the enemy positions both on foot and by air, has suggested that, under his command, the Mark Vs will be able to strip away large sections of barbed wire using their grappling iron attachment. You are aware just how effective these machines have been in destroying enemy morale elsewhere, and as the wire has hitherto proved an insurmountable problem, his advice is welcome.
Once the wire is removed you will need to deploy your limited numbers of infantry and cavalry best to achieve your primary objectives for Day 1, a foothold in Tsaritsyn’s southern suburbs, and a significant cavalry force exited off the northern table edge in order to outflank Tsaritsyn inside her defences. You should plan your attack to commence at 2am, in order to catch the Reds off guard.
Intelligence reports from Red deserters tell you that behind the wire are entrenched positions supported by MG nests and a small amount of artillery. A second defensive line, without wire, is located on the outskirts of Tsaritsyn itself. Between these two main lines you are aware that several Red batteries are deployed at Beketovska. These are the first main threat to your advancing infantry and cavalry, and should be neutralised as soon as possible.
This attack is critical. Should it fail and your force be significantly weakened, you will not be able to hold your ground in the face of an enemy counter-attack. Good luck, and for Holy Mother Russia, may all of her Saints aid you and guide your hand.
Red Verdun
Red Briefing
It is July 1919, and the city of Tsaritsyn on the Volga stands out as the immovable rock on which the forces of counter-revolution will dash themselves to certain destruction. Surrounding the city a chain of barbed wire and trenches have ensure that for the last three weeks the lackeys of the British imperialists, the whiteguards under General Wrangel have been held at bay. In that time considerable work has been undertaken to strengthen Tsaritsyn’s defences, and daily reinforcements from Siberia are ensuring that this Red Verdun will never fall. The enemies of the workers and peasants shall not pass!
In this, the sector of the line south of the city, you are directly facing the whiteguards lines. To the north and west White Cossacks are raiding into our rear areas, but, despite the actions of the interventionist airforce, the Volga flotilla ensures that supplies are able to get through to the fortress city. You must now man your lines with socialist fortitude and revolutionary strength of character in order to hold of any new assaults by the backsliding Whites. The free peoples of Russia watch your exploits with baited breath. Long live the Revolution! Death to all Counter-Revolutionaries and backsliding revisionists!
The forces allocated to this section are as follows:
37th Rifle Division
109th Brigade
325th Regiment (3 Battalions)
326th Regiment (3 Battalions)
110th Brigade
328th Regiment (3 Battalions)
330th Regiment (3 Battalions)
lllth Brigade
332nd Regiment (3 Battalions)
333rd Regiment (3 Battalions)
2 Artillery Batteries
38th Rifle Division
l12th Brigade
334th Regiment (3 Battalions)
336th Regiment (3 Battalions)
Reinforcement Brigade (ex11th Army)
Red Sailors Regiment (3 Battalions)
407th Regiment (3 Battalions)
1 Artillery Battery
Dumenko’s Cavalry Division
9 Regiments Red Cavalry
Fixed Batteries
Tsaritsyn Battery 2 Heavy Batteries
Beketovska Battery 2 Heavy Batteries
Red Armoured Train
Workers & Peasants United
2 heavy guns
1 armoured train infantry company
1 MG team
These should be allocated their own sections of defence on the map provided. The preliminary line, which lies before the barbed wire, is made up of slit trenches and a few MG nests. No provision for artillery emplacement has been made in this area. The main line of defence may have light emplacement for Divisional artillery, and may have a continuous trench line interspersed with MG nests. This may have up to two lines of trench, i.e. in depth, with communication trenches between the two. If so these need to be marked on the map. Again specific MG positions may be marked and fields of fire indicated.
Around Tsaritsyn a third line of defence may be made up of a single trench line, if desired buildings may be incorporated into that. Again Divisional artillery may be allocated light emplacements.
In Tsaritsyn itself are an armoured train Workers & Peasants United and Dumenko’s composite Cavalry Division. These may be called on if you can justify their presence in your sector.
UMPIRE’S NOTES
In terms of troop quality, it should be assumed that the White troops are generally better trained and led than the Reds, and also that their morale is higher at this juncture. The White Volunteer Army troops, i.e. the 7th Division, should be well-trained regular troops. The Cossacks and the bulk of the Reds should be drilled rather than regular, more second line troops, whilst some Reds should be militia quality. White cavalry should be significantly more enthusiastic than their Red counterparts in this battle, had we been talking about Budyonny then I would say otherwise, but Dumenko’s force was a composite one that was made up of odd cavalry units split away from their parent infantry Divisions and lumped together. As such they have no real esprit de corps in this situation. Artillery on both sides was pretty poorly handled; direct fireover open sites was the order of the day, rather than the sophisticated firetactics of the Western Front.
The tanks are over represented in terms of models, but this is simply in order to allow the White commander the tactical flexibility that the historical commanders had. As such the amount of damage that these can take should be restricted to reflect the smaller numbers. However, the moral effect of the tanks on the historical battlefield does suggest that this over-representation accurately reflects the impact that they had.
Infantry forces should have specific MG sections allocated to them, and cavalry have tchankas, the cart mounted MGs that provided them with mobile fire support. Ratios here will depend on the rule system that you are using.
I would allow the Reds to deploy their forces without telling them which units are good, bad or indifferent until they come into contact with the enemy. For the first six turns visibility should be restricted to effective rifle range to represent the fact that the early stages of the battle were at night. In turns seven and eight visibility should double, after which it is line of sight.
The White armoured train may not enter the battle until the start of the rail line near Beketovka falls to the White advance, once that happens the train may appear on the table immediately. The Red armoured train may be requested at any time. The umpire should not allow the train, or Red cavalry, to be called for until it is pretty obvious that this is a large scale White attack, not just a raid. Once this is clear a dice should be rolled each turn after the request for the train has been made, the train arriving on a 5 or 6. The Red cavalry will arrive two turns after it is requested. The Red player should not know how fast or potentially slow these reaction times may be.
The Red player may deploy as far south as the preliminary defensive positions, although not with artillery. These will be restricted to the main defensive line and further north. The White player may enter the table anywhere on its southern edge. He may stagger the arrival of his forces. If he chooses to do this he must programme the arrival times at the start of the game, these may not be altered after that. No aerial support is available during the battle for either side.
The Red player will win the game if he can stall the White advance around Beketovska. The White player will win if he can exit one relatively intact cavalry Division off the northern edge of the table and take Beketovska, or he takes Pestchanka and Voroponova. In terms of time scale, the actual attack started at 2am and finished at around 7pm. You may use whatever time-to-turn formulae your favourite rules suggest. I tend to use half an hour to a turn to give a basic framework.
