North Carolina, Johnston County,
March 19–21, 1865
When I learned that Sherman’s army was marching through the Salk swamps, making its own corduroy roads at the rate of a dozen miles a day, I made up my mind that there had been no such army in existence since the days of Julius Caesar. —General Joseph E. Johnston
No one ever has and may not agree with me as to the very great importance of the march north from Savannah. The march to the sea seems to have captured everybody, whereas it was child’s play compared with the other. —Major General William Tecumseh Sherman
By John G. Barrett
On March 18 just before dawn the Confederate chief of cavalry, CS Lieutenant General Wade Hampton, notified CS General Joseph E. Johnston that the Union army was marching on Goldsboro, not Raleigh, and that US Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s Right Wing was approximately half a day’s march in advance of the Left Wing. Johnston saw an opportunity to crush one of the Union columns while it was separated from the other. Johnston ordered his troops at Smithfield and Elevation to Bentonville, a village approximately twenty miles west of Goldsboro. CS General Braxton Bragg was at Smithfield with CS Major General Robert F. Hoke’s Division of North Carolinians, as well as remnants of the once-proud Army of Tennessee, the survivors of Franklin and Nashville, now under the command of CS Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart. CS Lieutenant General William J. Hardee was encamped at Elevation with the divisions of CS Major General Lafayette McLaws and CS Brigadier General W. B. Taliaferro. When Bragg and Stewart reached Bentonville on the eighteenth, Hardee was still six miles away.
Johnston’s combat strength was about 21,000, considerably fewer than the 45,000 Sherman thought opposed him. This paucity in manpower was offset, at least in part, by the large number of able Confederate commanders present. Besides Johnston and Bragg, who were full generals, three officers—Hampton, Hardee, and Stewart— carried the rank of lieutenant general. Also on the field were many seasoned officers of lesser rank, including Major Generals Daniel Harvey Hill, Joseph Wheeler, Robert F. Hoke, Lafayette Mc- Laws, and William W. Loring. Bentonville was singular among Civil War battles for having so few men led in combat by so many veteran officers of high rank.
During the evening of the eighteenth, Hampton informed Johnston that Union troops—US Major General Henry W. Slocum’s column, with the XIV Corps in the lead, US Major General Jefferson C. Davis commanding—were moving down the Goldsboro Road. He recommended a surprise attack at the eastern end of the Cole plantation, about two miles south of Bentonville near the Goldsboro Road. The land there was marshy and covered with dense thickets of blackjack pine.
Sunday morning, March 19, dawned clear and beautiful, and the unsuspecting Union soldiers expected a day of peace and quiet. They thought little of the fact that the Confederate cavalry was giving ground grudgingly and even revived an expression of the Atlanta campaign, “They don’t drive worth a damn.” Slocum, who had no idea that Johnston’s entire army was gathering only a few miles down the road, sent a dispatch to Sherman, who was with US Major General Oliver O. Howard, that only Confederate horsemen and a few pieces of artillery were in his front. Sherman did not anticipate an attack because he could not imagine that Johnston would risk a fight with the Neuse River in his rear.
The deployment of the Confederate troops was slow because only one road led through the dense woods and thickets between Bentonville and the battlefield. First, Hoke’s Division was placed on the Confederate left with its line crossing the Goldsboro Road almost at right angles. Stewart’s Army of Tennessee was to the right of Hoke, with its right strongly thrown forward to conform to the edge of an open field. The center of Johnston’s position was at a corner of the Cole plantation approximately a mile north of the Goldsboro Road. The two wings went forward from the center, the left blocking the advance of US Brigadier General W. P. Carlin’s division of the XIV Corps. The right was partially hidden in a thicket, ready to stop any flanking movements by the enemy. However, Hardee, who was to hold the ground between Hoke and Stewart, had not reached the field when the two commands went into position, so Johnston had to change the deposition of his troops. Hardee did not arrive until around 2:45 p.m., long after Hoke’s artillery had opened fire on Carlin’s advance troops, the brigades of US Brigadier Generals Harrison C. Hobart and George P. Buell, as they approached the Cole house.
As the morning advanced, Slocum, still convinced that he faced only cavalry, sent word to Sherman that help was not needed. At the same time he ordered a general advance. The Confederate right responded fiercely to the assault, and in the words of a Union officer, “I tell you it was a tight place . . . [we] stood as long as man could stand . . . [then] we run like the duce.” Carlin’s men fell back to the vicinity of the Cole house, where they deployed carelessly into a weak defensive line. Soon they were joined by US Brigadier General James S. Robinson’s brigade of the XX Corps. By this time US Brigadier General James D. Morgan’s division of the XIV Corps and US Lieutenant Colonel David Miles’s brigade of Carlin’s division had moved into position south of the Goldsboro Road opposite Hoke and on Carlin’s right. Log breastworks, thrown up in great haste by Morgan’s brigade commanders, US Brigadier Generals John G. Mitchell and William Vandever, and US Colonel Benjamin D. Fearing, contributed to the Union success late in the day when the Confederates went on the offensive. One Federal officer said that those logs “saved Sherman’s reputation.” Slocum realized that he was in trouble at 1:30 p.m., called for reinforcements, and went on the defensive.
At about 3:00 p.m. Johnston ordered his right wing under Hardee to take the offensive. Hardee, Stewart, and Hill led the charge on horseback “across an open field . . . with colors flying and line of battle in . . . perfect order. . . . It was gallantly done but for those watching from Hoke’s trenches it was . . . painful to see how close their battle flags were together, regiments being scarcely larger than companies and the division not much larger than a regiment should be.” The Union left was crushed by this stirring, well executed move and driven back in confusion upon the XX Corps under US Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams, a mile to the rear.
The rout of Carlin’s troops had exposed the Union right, enabling Hill to break through and strike Morgan’s division in the rear while Hoke attacked from the front. The result was the bitterest fighting of the day, the crucial period of the battle. Veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia thought “it was the hottest infantry fight they had been in except Cold Harbor.” Only the timely arrival of US Brigadier General William Cogswell’s brigade of the XX Corps saved Morgan from defeat. This was the turning point of the battle of Bentonville.
Later that afternoon, between 5:00 p.m. and sundown, McLaws’s Division and the exhausted troops of Taliaferro and CS Major General William B. Bate tried five times without success to carry the formidable Union left. As dusk faded into darkness, the weary combatants gradually ceased their firing. After burying their dead, the Confederate soldiers withdrew to the position they had occupied earlier in the day. The Union wounded were taken to the home of John and Amy Harper, which had been converted into a field hospital.
The next morning Johnston, anticipating the arrival of Sherman’s Right Wing, bent his left back to form a bridgehead, with the only bridge across Mill Creek to his rear. This put the Confederate line, in the shape of a large irregular V, entirely north of the Goldsboro Road.
On the late afternoon of March 20, Sherman’s army of 60,000was again united. Howard’s troops, the last to arrive on the battlefield, dug in on the right. The Union left was held by the XIV and XX Corps. There was heavy skirmishing throughout the second day, which occasionally erupted into violent combat, some of it involving the three regiments of North Carolina Junior Reserves in Hoke’s command.
On the twenty-first the only important action occurred on the Union right when US Major General Joseph A. Mower, without consulting his superiors, pushed two brigades around the Confederate left flank to within a mile of the Mill Creek bridge. Among the Confederate units helping to blunt this offensive was the skeletal 8th Texas Cavalry under Hardee’s immediate command. In a gallant charge by the cavalrymen against the Union left, Hardee’s sixteen-year-old son, Willie, was mortally wounded. A few hours earlier the father had reluctantly given his teenage son permission to join the Texans.
That night Johnston crossed Mill Creek and moved on Smithfield, beginning a withdrawal that could have “but one end.” Sherman, after burying the dead and removing the wounded, put his troops in motion for Goldsboro rather than in pursuit of his long-time antagonist.
Bentonville was a major contest, involving about 80,000 troops, and was the climax of Sherman’s highly successful Carolinas campaign. At Goldsboro Sherman joined his army with US Major General John M. Schofield’s two columns— US Major General Alfred H. Terry’s and US Major General Jacob D. Cox’s—and gained rail connections to the large supply bases on the North Carolina coast. Sherman’s campaign had laid waste a forty-five-mile-wide swath of countryside from Savannah to Goldsboro. When morale among his troops began to wane badly with the rumors of Richmond’s fall, Johnston directed that all executions for desertion be suspended. The time was almost at hand to end all killing.
Estimated Casualties: 1,527 US, 2,606 CS
