Georgia, Whitfield County and Dalton,
May 7–13, 1864
By Jay Luvaas
US Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s Atlanta campaign was a vital part of US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s strategic plan launched in the spring of 1864. While Grant moved against CS General Robert E. Lee near Fredericksburg, Virginia, with US Major General Philip H. Sheridan commanding the Federal cavalry, the navy tightened the blockade. US Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s forces attacked Richmond’s supply lines in Chesterfield County, Virginia. US Major General Franz Sigel battled CS Major General John C. Breckinridge in the first battle of the 1864 Shenandoah campaign at New Market. US Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, whose orders were to expand Federal control of Louisiana, had lost the battle of Mansfield and had retreated back down the Red River.
Grant sent Sherman, the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, to break up CS General Joseph E. Johnston’s army in north Georgia. Sherman was also to prevent Johnston from sending troops to reinforce Lee in Virginia, and “get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.” Atlanta was a Confederate logistical and industrial center with four major railroads.
US Major General George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland was the largest in Sherman’s 110,100-man army group, with about 72,900. US Major General James B. McPherson had nearly 24,400 in his Army of the Tennessee, almost twice as many as US Major General John M. Schofield’s Army of the Ohio with 12,800. The estimated strength of the Confederate forces under Johnston was 54,500, before CS Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk’s Corps from the Army of Mississippi joined Johnston’s Army of Tennessee in stages from Resaca to Cassville.
Johnston had taken command of the Army of Tennessee after the Confederate defeat at Chattanooga the previous November, and he began to address the army’s problems: the condition of the horses, the infantry’s lack of shoes, blankets, and small arms, and the morale and discipline of the troops. Sherman’s overriding concern was logistics: he had sufficient men and equipment, but he had to accumulate vast quantities of food and forage in the Nashville and Chattanooga storehouses and then transport them to the armies in the field.
Confederate earthworks and gun positions lined the precipitous Rocky Face Ridge near Dalton. At Mill Creek Gap, known locally as Buzzard’s Roost, there were more formidable earthworks. According to Sherman, batteries extended the “whole length from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the farther end like a traverse directly across its debouch.” Johnston had fortified all approaches to Dalton from the north and west to protect the junction there of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad with the Western & Atlantic.
By May 7 Sherman’s army group was in motion. He ordered McPherson’s army on a turning movement through Snake Creek Gap to sever the railroad near Resaca. To keep Johnston distracted at Dalton, Sherman sent Thomas to move in force against Tunnel Hill, a lesser ridge west of Rocky Face, and Schofield to approach Dalton from the north. By late afternoon the Confederate outposts had fallen back to prepared positions on the slopes of Rocky Face.
On May 8 a regiment of the Union XIV Corps seized Blue Mountain, southeast of Tunnel Hill, and used it as a lookout and signal station. A brigade from US Major General Oliver O. Howard’s IV Corps ascended the northern end of Rocky Face and moved south along the narrow crest. Sherman ordered Thomas to seize Dug Gap, four miles farther south, and to attack Confederate works along the northern half of Rocky Face Ridge. Schofield was to make a strong demonstration against the Confederate right flank in Crow Valley north of Dalton. In the afternoon two brigades from US Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 4,500-man division of the XX Corps assaulted the Confederate position at Dug Gap, but they were thrown back by CS Colonel J. Warren Grigsby’s cavalry, reinforced by CS Brigadier General Daniel H. Reynolds’s infantry, later supported by CS Brigadier General Hiram B. Granbury’s infantry brigade.
On May 9 Union infantry moved forward to probe for other weak points in the five-hundred foot- high Rocky Face barrier. US Brigadier General Charles G. Harker’s brigade reached the crest, but the terrain was so rough and narrow that in places the men could advance only in single file. Harker hit the angle where the right of CS Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham’s Division joined the left of CS Major General Carter L. Stevenson’s Division. The fight “was obstinate and bloody,” Stevenson reported. The main Confederate position on the slope and crest of Rocky Face Ridge could not be carried. The Union suffered 837 casualties, the Confederates 600.
Thomas convinced Sherman that his troops could not take Rocky Face Ridge and that any attempt to insert columns “into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal.” Sherman called the gap “the door of death.” On May 11 he left Howard’s IV Corps and two cavalry divisions to “keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton” and marched with the rest of his forces to join McPherson at Snake Creek Gap. The following afternoon CS Major General Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry division followed the trail of Schofield’s army around the north end of Rocky Face. Wheeler learned from prisoners that Sherman was headed for Resaca. By 1:00 a.m. on May 13 the Confederates had withdrawn from their positions near Buzzard’s Roost and marched to Resaca. Howard’s IV Corps occupied Dalton.
Estimated Casualties: 837 US, 600 CS
