
West Wall Offensive 16th – 23rd November, 1944
October, 1944. The break out from the Normandy Peninsula had been made. The wild race across eastern France, culminating in operation Market‑Garden, the failed attempt to end the war in 1944, was over. Allied armies were poised on the borders of the Germany. One more blow would smash the Thousand Year Reich forever.
THE SITUATION
In the north, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, stalled on the Rhine, was clearing the Peel Marshes and the seaward approaches to Antwerp. Bradley’s 12th Army Group, just to the south of the British, had taken Aachen after bitter fighting, only to be stopped at Schmidt. In the south, Dever’s 6th Army Group had ground to a halt in the Vosges Mountains after a successful crossing of the Moselle late in September. All across the western front, from the Dutch border in the north to the Swiss frontier in the south, the great Allied offensive was over. Logistics and weather had combined to do what the Germans could not; stop the Allied drive on the Reich.
This was the background to the strategic conference of October 18 1944, convened at Brussels to plan strategy on the next phase of the war. Three factors weighed heavily on Eisenhower’s mind and these largely determined the outcome of the conference.
German casualties were running at approximately 4,000 per day, or one 1944 type infantry division every other day. Since this was well below the German replacement rate, the enemy was growing stronger rather than weaker.
A pause in offensive operations would give the Wehrmacht time to train its new formations and prepare defensive positions.
Allied intelligence indicated that German jet aircraft production was on the threshold of a large increase in output, and that the Germans were close to developing a proximity fused anti‑aircraft projectile. That spelled trouble for the massed strategic bombing campaign to contain the German war economy.
The conference concluded with the decision to resume the offensive, code named Operation QUEEN, an attack by the American First and Ninth Armies. The Allies reasoned that by husbanding their supplies and attacking on a narrow front with overwhelming air support, a decisive break through might be achieved. If the weather cooperated, QUEEN would begin on the 5th of November with 4.500 aircraft, half of them heavy bombers, pulverizing the German front from Geilenkirken in the north to Hürtgen in the south. To appreciate the size of this undertaking, operation COBRA, the break out from Normandy, was supported by just 1500 aircraft. In the First Army sector alone, 40 battalions of field artillery were positioned to fire on an eight mile front. The whole operation had all the earmarks of another great breakout.
Operation QUEEN consisted of two efforts, by the Ninth and First Armies. Ninth army was to attack along a front just to the south of Geilenkirken extending to and encompassing Wuselen. The initial effort was to be made by the XIX Corps, consisting of the US 2nd Armored, 29th Infantry and 30th Infantry Divisions. Its objective was to seize Julich and Linnich, forcing the crossing of the Roer River. First Army was to attack just to the south of the Ninth. The lead element was VII Corps, consisting of 104 Infantry, 3rd Armored and 1st Infantry. Later it was reinforced by V Corps, including the 8th Infantry. First Army’s initial effort was to capture the Eschweiler‑Weisweiler industrial complex, followed by the capture of Duren and the forcing of the Roer River crossings.
In order to understand the First Army offensive we must understand four things: the terrain, the weather and the attacking and defending forces. The battle was fought in a dense growth commonly referred to as the Hürtgen Forest. Characterized by thickly treed land with a heavy undergrowth, the forest canalized movement along its few roads and paths. The terrain was wet, plagued by fog and heavily mined in places. Fallen trees and numerous gorges made for ideal defensive terrain.
Splitting the Hürtgen Forest in two was a section of ground running from Stohlberg to Eschweiler, the “Stohlberg Corridor”. It was the only sector truly suited for armored operations. North of the corridor the woods generally gave out onto a plain that eventually merged with the Roer River further to the north. South of the corridor extended the Hamich ridge, dominated by Hill 232, which denied access from the Stohlberg Corridor to Eschweiler‑Weisweiler.
To smash through this forbidding terrain, VII Corps commander ‘lightning’ Joe Collins deployed three reinforced divisions, the 104th Infantry, 1st Infantry and the 4th Infantry, all supported by 32 battalions of field artillery and numerous tank and tank destroyer battalions. The 104th (Timberwolf) Division commanded by Terry Allen was a green division deployed north of the Stohlberg Corridor. Its objective was to clear the woods north of the Corridor and eventually fight its way into Eschweiler. The division lay on the corps boundary with the Ninth Army located further to the north. The 104th had landed in Europe on 24 August and had yet to fight its first engagement.
The 3rd armored was a veteran unit of proven capacity commanded by Maurice Rose. Its mission was to enter the Stohlberg Corridor, break up whatever German formations it encountered along the way, and assist in securing Eschweiler and Weisweiler. The 3rd Armored was attached to the 1st Infantry and only Combat Command B participated in the offensive.
The 1st Infantry needs little introduction. An elite unit, its mission was to attack south of the Stohlberg Corridor along the Hamich Ridge towards Hill 232, spreading out its front as it advanced in the general direction of Gressenich, Hamich and Merberich towards the Roer plain. To assist it, the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division was attached. 1st Infantry’s sector was to be the main thrust of Operation QUEEN.
On the right of the 1st Infantry lay the 4th Infantry. A veteran unit, it had to fight its way through the densest portions of the Hurtgen Forest, and break out of the woods in the region between Gey and the Hof Hardt castle 4th Division was spread across four miles of difficult terrain and its 12th Regiment began the battle chewed up from earlier German counter attacks from Hurtgen. The absence of major roads in the forest would make re‑supply precarious.
Opposing this formidable force was a motley collection of ragged German formations outnumbered by five to one. Opposite the 4th Division in the south the Germans had deployed the 275th Infantry Division. The 275th was an amalgamation of 6,500 men from 37 different, previously shattered, combat units and had no reserves. Its 985th regiment was down to 250 men but the division boasted 106 artillery pieces.
In the center the Germans had posted the 12th Infantry Division. This unit had three regiments of infantry plus artillery, 6,400 men in all. German commanders considered it the best division in the sector and it was rated as capable of limited offensive operations. It was scheduled for relief by the 47th Volks Grenadier (VG) Division at the beginning of the offensive.
The 47th Volks Grenadier Division was a new unit which had drawn half its men from Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine formations, plus a sprinkling of units gathered from all over Germany. Their equipment was good, but the division was given only six weeks training before commitment. Not much was expected of it and it lived up to those expectations, being smashed by the 1st Division in three days.
Bordering the Corridor and to the north lay units of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier (Pz. Gr.)Division. This unit had been badly ground up in the battle for Aachen, and was not considered as good as the 12th. Not considered fit for offensive operations, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier was fortunate to be opposite the untried 104th.
Operation QUEEN began at 12:00 noon on the 16th of November, and began badly. Fog and mist grounded all but 2,400 heavy bombers on their runways in England. Bad weather also crippled the effort from the IX and XXIX tactical air forces assigned to close air support. What did get through failed to achieve anything like the psychological impact of a much smaller effort made in Normandy back in August, and the Germans were scarcely affected.
Timed to coincide with the air support came the artillery preparation 694 field pieces fired off 50,000 rounds on the afternoon of the 16th. Here to, things did not begin with great success. In the sector of the 104th Division, the Division’s artillery inexplicably failed to fire at all on the first day.
The infantry and tank attacks began on schedule and immediately ran into difficulties everywhere. In the north, the 104th Division pushed east with curious timidity and could not turn the flank north of Stohlberg. In the center CCB of the 3rd Armor abruptly stalled in front of the Donnerberg Castle, which resisted all attacks for three days. 1st Division attacked along the Hamich Ridge towards Hamich village but the attack was quickly contained by the 12th Volks Grenadier three days later the Big Red One still had not captured Hamich.
Barton’s 4th Division attacked on cue and bogged down just as quickly. Its weakened regiments were in no condition to properly support the 1st Division on its left and the attack produced heavy casualties and little real estate.
The poor road network in its sector made resupply difficult and the terrain in front of the 4th was the worst along the entire 1st Army Front. So bad was the situation in the south that on the 17th the 4th Division was unable to attack at all.
To make things worse, the weather deteriorated, turning to light rain, mist and fog, hindering air support and artillery spotting. The roads turned to quagmires and re‑supply became the critical factor.
Finally though, the attack made progress. After three days of attrition and few reinforcements the German position in the Donnerberg abruptly collapsed.
The Donnerberg fell on the 18th ; 1st Division captured Hill 232 on the 18th and the 4th Division simply ground down the 275th Division to progress to within half a mile of the Gut Schwarzenbroich castle. However, this did not resemble the grand design of a rapid break out on the scale of Cobra.
Heavy casualties and slow penetration characterized the progress that had been made.
At this point, when the front was giving way, the Germans committed whatever reserves they could scrounge. The 47th VG Div was thrown in to beef up the 12th VG sector opposite the 1st Division. A kampfgruppe from the 116th Panzer (Pz.) Division and the 104th VG Regt launched a counterattack to retake Hamich and Hill 232. It was beaten off but the effort did stabilize the front in the German center.
In the south, opposite the 4th Division, the Germans rushed forward the remnants of two VG divisions, the 344th and 353rd and also threw in shattered contingents of the 116th Panzer by the 20th these had stiffened the 275th Division considerably, and the 4th’s attack ground to a halt.
Battle options
As the Allies you must get going quickly. Take the Donnerberg as soon as possible and get armor moving up the Stohlberg Corridor before the Germans can commit the 47th VG and the 116th Pz. This was, after all, the original Allied plan. The Corridor is vital because of its suitability for armored operations. You will have to exercise some caution. The German units opposing you will generally be of poor quality, and often will be kampfgruppes or remnants. However all other advantages like terrain and weather will usually be on their side. Be careful with the 4th Division. It is not in good shape and if you push it too hard you are asking for trouble.
As the Germans you have an interesting position. You must hold the Donnerberg for as long as possible. The longer you hold the Donnerberg, the better your chances of being able to commit the 47th VG to stopping the Big Red One opposite Hamich. Then you can feed in your hastily reassembled kampfgruppe reinforcements into a delaying action along the corridor. Fight all out for Eschweiler. In the south things should be simpler. If the American player gets too aggressive with the 4th a counter‑attack may be in order. Don’t do it too early or you will be in trouble.
VARIANTS
Better Weather. The weather was terrible for most of the battle. Adjust the start weather to something more suitable for air operations and the Americans will do much better.
More Aggressive 104th. The 104th Division was green, fouled its opening attack and was sluggish throughout the rest of the battle. Assume that it performed somewhat better first time out. Increase the experience of all battalions where appropriate and increase HQ admin and leadership.
5th Armour to the Rescue. The 4th infantry ran into such difficulties during the battle that Bradley decided to commit the V Corps 5th Arm XX. 5th Arm actually turned up on the 23rd and blasted right into Hurtgen city. Assume a more realistic appraisal of the initial situation. Model the CCR of the 5th Armored on the CCB of the 3rd Armored attached to 104th Infantry. Attach the CCR to the 4th Infantry.
What was the “Kall trail”?

I’ve walked the Kall trail with Mr. Ray Fleig, former US tank platoon leader who used the trail to get his Shermans up to the town of Schmidt in early November 1944. The Kall Trail was designated as the main supply route (MSR) for the attack being carried out on the town of Schmidt by the US 28th Infantry Division. Beginning at the village of Vossenack, the Kall Trail left this ridgeline and dipped into the rather steep Kall Gorge, crossed the Kall creek, then climbed up the other side. The trail was very narrow with a lot of switchbacks which made it very difficult for tanks and other vehicles to negotiate. Several Shermans of Fleig’s platoon slid off the trail or blocked it, effectively bringing the movement of supplies to the US troops in Schmidt to a halt. When they were trying to establish defensive positions in Schmidt, the Germans, fully awoken now to the danger posed by the US attack, launched a counterattack using elements of the 116th Panzer Division and the 89th Infantry Division. To make a long story short, the Americans suffered a crushing defeat, losing over 4,000 men. They were forced not only to abandon Schmidt and the neighboring village of Kommerscheidt, they had to retreat down the Kall trail, across the creek and back up again until they finally found safety in Vossenack. Fleig was forced to abandon all of his tanks (though not before he had destroyed 3 Pz.IVs) since the trail had been interdicted by the 116th Panzer’s reconnaissance battalion (oops, I mean Abteilung). If you go to the Kall trail today, you can still see a section of embedded track from one of Ray Fleig’s Shermans as well as many old foxholes and fighting positions. In retrospect, the 28th Infantry Division’s scheme of maneuver was sheer folly, since it became patently obvious that they could not sustain a reinforced infantry regiment along such an inadequate supply route. By the way, every year the community of Hürtgen hosts a military march competition whereby participants of all NATO countries take part. The route includes not only most of the major sites from the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest, but the Kall Trail as well.
Doug Nash
These are the main protagonists;
3rd FJ Div, 12th, 47th and 272nd VGD, 89th, 275th, 344th, 353rd Infantry Divs, 116th Pz Div, 116th Panzer.
There were numerous Festungs (Fortress), Politzei (Police)units too; there are a number of great sites on the net related to this campaign.
The Westwall, or Siegfried Line, an immense, 650 km long fortified barrier along the German border. This is where the allied assault came to a halt after the failed attempt to capture the bridge across the Rhine in Arnhem. To gain momentum again, a small US offensive was staged to break through to the river Ruhr and from there through the Kolnisch Lowlands to the Rhine. After the capture of Aachen on the 21st of October, the 1st US Army had to secure their right flank, the Hürtgen Forest.
This dense, dark forest, an area 30 by 15 kilometers wide, was filled with concrete bunkers, dug-in strongholds, gorges, German soldiers, streams, barbed wire, tripwires, muddy roads, and mines: truly a Green Hell.
The 9th US Division already lost 4,500 men during its attempt to cross the forest. They were relieved by the 28th Division. Within two weeks, losses were so high; they were replaced by the 8th Division. Another division, the 4th, followed by the 83rd and the 5th Armoured, were also send into the forest…all in all, 120,000 men. Only on the 13th of December, troops of the 83rd and 5th division reached the other site of the forest, leaving 24,000 dead, wounded, missing or captured US soldiers behind…
The ordeal of the 28th Infantry Division
The 28th smashed into the Hürtgen Forest, 2 November 1944, and in the savage seesaw battle which followed, Vossenack and Schmidt changed hands several times…
The U.S. 28th Infantry Division, a Pennsylvania National Guard unit, arrived on October 16 to relieve the battered 9th Infantry Division.
The 28th Division was reinforced with armor, tracked transport Weasels and air support. Of its three regiments, one was deployed to protect the northern flank, another to attack Germeter, and the third to capture Schmidt, the main objective. The area had terrible terrain with the Kall Trail running along a deep river ravine. This was not tank country, despite the need for armor to support the infantry.
The attack by 28th Division started on November 2; the defenders were expecting it and were ready. The U.S. 109th Infantry Regiment was impeded after 300 yards by an unexpected minefield, pinned down by mortar and artillery fire and harassed by local counterattacks. One mile was gained after two days, after which the 109th dug-in and endured casualties. The U.S. 112th Infantry Regiment attacked Vossenack and the neighboring ridge, which were captured on November 2. The 112th was then halted on the Kall by strong defenses and difficult terrain. The U.S. 110th Infantry Regiment had to clear the woods next to the River Kall, capture Simonskall, and maintain a supply route for the advance on Schmidt; again these were very difficult tasks due to weather, prepared defenses, determined defenders, and terrain. The weather prevented tactical air support until November 5.
The 112th captured Schmidt on November 3, cutting the German supply route to Monschau but no American supply, reinforcement or evacuation was possible as the Kall Trail was blocked. A strong German counterattack by tanks of 116th Panzer Division and infantry from 89th Division rapidly expelled the Americans from Schmidt and they were unable to counterattack. For two days, the 112th remained hard pressed to hold its positions outside Schmidt.
On November 6, the U.S. 12th Infantry Regiment was detached from the U.S. 4th Division and sent to reinforce the 28th Division
Across the Kall Bridge the troops of the 28th US Infantry Division pushed forward at the beginning of November 1944 to capture the village of Schmidt. After a few days, the so-called “Allerseelenschlacht” resulted in a disaster for the Americans. As American troops tried to retreat across this bridge to Vossenack, great parts of the Kall Valley were already cut off by the Germans. A German regimental doctor, Captain Guenther Stuettgen, managed to negotiate an unofficial ceasefire with the Americans at the Kall Bridge from November 7 to the twelfth, in order to attend to the wounded of both sides. The lives of many American soldiers were saved by German paramedics.
At Vossenack, the 2nd battalion of the 112th disintegrated after constant shelling and fled a German attack. Following the providential arrival of two U.S. armored platoons of tanks and M10 Wolverine tank destroyers, supported by those 2nd battalion men who had held tight, and two companies of 146th Engineers operating as infantry, the Americans held on and the fighting for Schmidt continued until November 10.
…Later that day, the remaining defenses east of the Kall were pulled back after Major General Norman Cota received permission from First Army. The disaster that had befallen the 28th Division led to a visit by all the senior US Army brass, including Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and Gerow. Divisional casualties to date had been 6,184, with the hapless 112th Infantry (Regt) having suffered 2,093 battle casualties, as well as 544 non-battle casualties from combat exhaustion and trench foot. Total German casualties in this phase of the Hürtgenwald fighting were 2,900, and the 116th Panzer Division alone needed 1,800 replacements with GR 1055 needing 490.
The reasons for the debacle were many. To begin with, the attack plan dispersed the 28th Division on three separate and uncoordinated missions leaving each regiment isolated. With two of the regiments tied down in the German defenses on the shoulders, this left the 112th Infantry exposed to the full force of two German divisions. The isolation of the battalions of the 112th Infantry due to the terrain allowed the Germans to destroy the 112th Infantry piecemeal, a battalion at a time. The dispositions of the 2/112th Infantry in Vossenack were poor, and Kommerscheidt’s isolation due to the Kall trail made it unusually vulnerable. The decision to postpone Operation Queen from November 5 to November 16 due to the poor weather doomed the 28th Division, since it allowed the German 7th Army to throw all of its reserves into the Hürtgenwald. This included a considerable amount of artillery, which was instrumental in reducing the 112th Infantry positions in Kommerscheidt and Vossenack, and also permitted the participation of the 7th Army’s operational reserve, the 116th Panzer Division.
Spence Toll, was at Schmidt crossroad during the battle, he wrote:
I don’t know the reasons for the silence of the 28th Division’s WWII veterans, but the scholars who study Hürtgen appreciate what a disastrous episode it was. For example’ my friend Russell Weigley, Temple U.’s distinguished military historian, likens the 28th’s Hürtgen involvement to the Civil War’s Wilderness or WWI’s Argonne. I came into Hürtgen after most of the 28th’s blood had been spilled, but I have a vivid memory of what a frozen version of hell it was.
(He then quotes an excerpt from Ernest Hemingway’s account published in Collier’s issue of November 1944 describing the fighting. Hemingway was a war correspondent with the 28th at that time. The account is the usual description of tree bursts, darkness and fighting in wooded area. He continues) To give our division a chance to recover from its savaging, the strategists sent us to a quiet place on the front. It was the Ardennes.
The irony of the last sentence is striking. On 19 November, the Division moved south to hold a 25-mile sector along the Our River in Luxembourg.
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